Abstract. Satellite-based navigation requires precise knowledge of the structure of the transmitted signals.
ICAO Threat Model for Signal Deformations:
Several candidate threat models-spanning the range from very simple models to very complex-were initially proposed to explain the SV19 event (Enge et al, 1999) . Such threats manifest themselves in the form of an anomalous correlation peak. Accordingly, each of the following may result in uncorrected error for a differential GPS (DGPS) user with a receiver configuration that differs from that of the reference station:
• Dead zones: "Flat spots," or plateaus atop the correlation peak, are regions of zero discriminator gain. The airborne and reference receiver correlator pairs may "track" in different portions of this region.
• Distortions:
Asymmetries caused by underdamped oscillations in the correlation function may affect the airborne receivers differently than the reference station. Even using multiple correlators, monitor receivers may not detect these distortions.
• False peaks: Significant distortion of the correlation peak may cause some receivers to lock onto (i.e., track) the distorted or evil waveform (EWF)-induced peak-a raised oscillation-instead of the true one.
A "2 nd -Order Step" based model was developed to address these three correlation peak pathologies. It was adopted by the International Civilian Aviation Organization (ICAO) in May of 2000 as the standard method for modeling anomalous signal deformation. This threat model is capable of generating deadzones, distortions, and false peaks on the receiver correlation peak. It fits well with observations and provides plausible explanations the measured code distortion and nearly 10 meter differential vertical position errors. It uses only three parameters and is accordingly relatively simple to simulate and test. In addition, this model generates causal waveforms, which are more plausible candidates for future failure modes of the real satellite signal generating hardware.
As illustrated in Fig. , the ICAO threat model approximates three specific classes of failure modes: digital, analog, and combination (analog and digital) failure modes. This model assumes the anomalous waveform is some combination of second-order ringing (an analog failure mode) and lead/lag (a digital failure mode) of the pseudorandom noise code chips. The model includes parameter bounds for F d (damped natural frequency), σ (damping), and Δ (lead/lag). An effective ground signal quality monitoring (SQM) implementation-such as the ones envisioned for Wide Area Augmentation Systems (WAAS)-would detect any and all such deformations that would result in unacceptably large DGPS pseudorange errors. (Phelts, 2001) Signal deformation threat models specific to each of the modernized signals have not been defined as yet. However, the ICAO threat model provides a good starting point for these investigations.
The aforementioned peak pathologies characterize a wide variety of deformations about which WAAS is concerned. The bounds used to limit the ICAO threat model parameters (Phelts et al, 2000) may not necessarily apply.
Still, preliminary analyses of robustness against these threats and tracking design constraints can begin to be made by applying these (and other) parameter values to the envisioned codes. The results should provide some insights into practical threat model bounds and system receiver design constraints.
Analysis

Mathematical Models of Signals
The analysis of this paper assumes the incoming signals have been translated to baseband and are phase locked with zero phase error. To model a BOC(n,m) code at a chipping rate of m*1.023MHz, the following equation may be used
where ) ( s n t is a square wave of frequency n*1.023MHz.
For this paper, the GPS PRN1 was used for ) ( m t c . A square wave was then modulated onto it at a frequency of n*1.023MHz.
Code distortion may be analyzed by examining the autocorrelation functions. The ideal autocorrelation function ) ( f C R * is the complex conjugate of the power spectrum of the replica code.
Correlation Peak Distortion models
A digital lead/lag distortion can be modeled as a circular shift of a single code sequence added/subtracted from a standard code sequence.
A general equation for modeling lead or lag distortions is given below ( ) (
It follows that a correlation peak distorted by this failure mode is found from
The transfer function of the 2 nd -order filter for representing the analog failure mode is given by Using this filter to modify the incoming signal yields the following expression for the deformed correlation peak
where we have substituted s = σ+2πjf, into
as the frequency domain representation of the 2nd-order response filter function.
The equation for the correlation function of a signal affected by both analog and digital failure modes is provided below. An exploration of the errors resulting from this combination failure mode is beyond the scope of this paper
Satellite and Receiver Filter models
For this paper only infinite bandwidth, ideal "brick wall" rectangular filters were modeled. The center frequencies (f c ) and bandwidths of these filters are found according to the respective ICD specifications of the following fullbandwidth signals: GPS C/A code, GPS-L5, and Galileo.
All of the current and envisioned GNSS signals except for the E5a/b signal were filtered using a rectangular filter of magnitude 0dB for f c -20≤bw≤ f c +20 and -200dB otherwise. The E5a/b signal for Galileo, however, is a BOC(15,10) code and is 90MHz wide. The first filter applied to it had a magnitude of 0dB for ( n,m f c )-45≤bw≤( n,m f c )+45 and -200dB otherwise. To single out the E5a signal a secondary filter was applied at a frequency offset of ( 15,10 f c )-22.5*1.023MHz and a bandwidth of 45MHz was also applied. The transition band attenuation for this filter was 30dB per octave. For simplicity, no group delay effects were modeled in this analysis; however, this is an added design variable that will need to be included in more comprehensive investigations.
Tracking error models
Assuming coherent tracking and negligible phase error, the steady-state tracking error for an early-minus-late discriminator about the equilibrium point is given by equation 11 below.
A comparison of how this discriminator compares to other implementations is not included in this paper.
Summary of Assumptions
The tracking error biases for correlator spacings relative to an ideal, undistorted correlation peak were modeled. No measurement noise or multipath errors were considered. (Correlator spacings will be given in chips, where the chip size, is determined by the chipping rate m.)
Only standard early-minus late tracking was analyzed, and the carrier loop was assumed to be phase-locked and have zero phase error.
Digital Failure mode:
The range of this failure was modeled to be between 0 to 0.12 microseconds-the maximum extent of the ICAO threat model for GPS C/A code-in increments of 0.01 microseconds. For the Galileo codes, the deformation was assumed to occur on the square wave generator(s) only.
It is later demonstrated that larger errors may occur if both code and square wave modulators are both assumed to be distorted; a smaller tracking errors can be observed if only the code modulator is affected. Note that for Galileo or GPS codes with m≥1-chip, lead/lag distortion may precipitate excessive bit-errors or perhaps a loss of continuous tracking in an actual receiver. Alternatively, it may simply result in multiple peaks, so this possible threat limitation was not considered in this analysis.
Analog failure mode:
This failure was modeled for each code type using a single (example) correlator spacing. The range of the damped frequency parameter was 1≤F d ≤50MHz in 1MHz increments. The current ICAO threat model extends, at most, to 17MHz (single-sided bandwidth) for this failure mode. The attenuation parameter was assumed to vary according to 0.1≤σ≤10MNepers/sec in increments of 1MNep/s. The ICAO threat model for GPS C/A code uses 0.8≤σ≤8.8MNepers/sec.)
Results
Each of the following GPS and assumed Galileo code autocorrelations were modeled for the digital-only and analog-only failure modes:
• 
Digital Distortion
Figures 5 through 7 contrast the nominal and deformed peaks with a Δ=0.1μsec for each of the following code modulations: BOC(0,1) and BOC(1,1); BOC(0,10) and BOC(10,5); BOC(15,2.5) and BOC(15,10), respectively. Each plot normalizes the correlation peak offsets (x-axis) by the chipping rate. (Relative to Figure 4 , each peak appears m times as wide.) Because the digital deformation primarily causes a shift of the correlation peak (rather than inducing asymmetries) the errors vary more as a function of increasing Δ than correlator spacing. Previous research has shown that some Δ is present even on the exiting GPS signals (Mitelman, 2005; Brenner et al, 2002 The analog deformation primarily causes correlation peak asymmetry. As a result, these errors will vary significantly as a function of correlator spacing. For any given correlator spacing, the errors vary primarily as a function of F d . As with the digital failure, previous research has shown that some second-order ringing is also present even on the exiting GPS signals (Mitelman, 2005 
Conclusions
The digital and analog failure modes of the ICAO threat model were applied to the ideal, envisioned signals for GPS and Galileo. The errors were shown to vary significantly as a function of early-minus-late correlator spacings and threat model parameters. Higher-frequency modulations seem to decrease the maximum error due to either failure mode; however they tend to introduce some unpredictability with respect to correlator spacing. For high-integrity differential applications such as WAAS and LAAS, these factors should be considered in the selection of a correlator configuration for a reference receiver and in the span of allowable configurations for avionics receivers.
These results demonstrate the need for a precise threat model definition, receiver filter design, and code tracking implementation constraints. However, if these are considered together, it may be possible to envision a differential system that minimizes the impact of these failures in the future.
